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Abstract
In the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the
costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters’ preference orders. The goal is to find
such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the
first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem for the case of
positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.
1 Introduction
We provide approximation algorithms and inapproximability results for the SHIFT-BRIBERY prob-
lem, introduced by Elkind et al. [EFS09] to capture the idea of campaigning in elections. Briefly
put, we are given an election where each voter ranks the candidates from the most to the least
appealing one, and our goal is to ensure that a given preferred candidate becomes the winner. To
this end, we can shift this candidate up within the voters’ preference orders, but each such shift
comes with a price (which, for example, measures the difficulty of convincing the voter that our
candidate is more appealing than the voter originally thought). Naturally, we are interested in
finding as cheap a solution as possible.
While the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem was introduced in the context of buying votes and in the
context of campaigning, bribery problems have a number of other applications (see, e.g., the
works on the margin of victory problem [MRS11, Car11, Xia12] and on measuring candidate suc-
cess [FST17]; see also the original paper of Faliszewski et al. [FHH09] and the survey of Faliszewski
and Rothe [FR16]). For example, a Formula 1 season consists of about 20 races, where each race
can be seen as a voter ranking the candidates (the drivers) in the order in which they finished the
race. For each finishing position, there is an associated number of points and the driver who col-
lects most points becomes the world champion (i.e., this “election” uses a positional scoring rule as a
voting rule). We can use the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem to measure how close each driver was to win-
ning the world championship. For example, we can set the price for shifting a driver up by some t
positions in a given race to be the difference between the finishing times of the driver and whoever
ranked t positions higher. Then, the cheapest shift bribery corresponds to the smallest speed-up
that the driver needed to become the world champion. As argued by Faliszewski et al. [FST17],
such values can be far more informative than the score differences between the drivers. Bribery
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problems also appear in the contexts of lobbying [BEF+07, BEF+14], rating systems [GST18], or in
combinatorial domains [BEER15].
With the exception of a few simple voting rules, such as the k-Approval family of rules and the
Bucklin rule, SHIFT-BRIBERY tends to be NP-hard (see the works of Elkind et al. [EFS09] and
Schlotter et al. [SFE17]). Indeed, this is the case, e.g., for Borda, Copeland, Maximin [EFS09]
and various elimination-based rules [MNRS18]. Yet, in many cases it can be solved quite ef-
fectively. For example, for the case of Borda there is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algo-
rithm of Elkind et al. [EFS09, EF10] and several FPT algorithms of Bredereck et al. [BCF+16]. On
the other hand, for the case of Copeland, SHIFT-BRIBERY is W[1]-hard for many natural parame-
ters [BCF+16]1 and the best known polynomial-time approximation algorithm has linear approxi-
mation ratio [EF10].
In fact, the difference between the Borda rule (and, in general, the positional scoring rules) and
the Copeland rule is even more striking. We show that the former can be solved nearly perfectly
in polynomial time, whereas for the latter we give strong inapproximability results:
1. Our main contribution is the first polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for SHIFT-
BRIBERY for positional scoring rules (Theorem 12). In fact, our algorithm works even for
the case where the scoring vectors are different for different voters. Our algorithm uses
linear programming and, in particular, basic solutions of linear programs. For the case of
unit prices (i.e., for the case where each unit shift has the same cost) we even obtain an
EPTAS, i.e., a PTAS for which the non-polynomial factors in the running time depend on the
approximation ratio only (Theorem 7). We also show a simple combinatorial PTAS for this
case (Theorem 4).
2. For the case of the Copeland rule, we give a reduction that preserves approximation ratios up
to some polynomial from the DENSEST k-SUBGRAPH (DkS) problem to SHIFT-BRIBERY (The-
orem 14). Since it is generally believed that Densest k-Subgraph is hard to approximate up
to a polynomial factor [BCV+12, Man17], the same beliefs transfer to the case of Copeland-
SHIFT-BRIBERY. In particular, this gives an almost-polynomial ratio hardness of approximat-
ing Copeland-SHIFT-BRIBERY under the ETH and Gap-ETH assumptions (Corollary 15). We
also show that under Gap-ETH, Copeland-SHIFT-BRIBERY does not admit an FPT approxi-
mation scheme for the parameterization by the number of unit shifts (Theorem 16) or by the
number of affected voters (Theorem 17), even for the case of unit prices. This is in contrast
to parameterization by the number of voters or by the number of candidates, for which FPT
approximation schemes are known to exist [BCF+16].
Together with the results of Elkind et al. [EFS09, EF10] and Bredereck et al. [BCF+16], our work
gives a nearly complete view of the complexity and approximability of SHIFT-BRIBERY for posi-
tional scoring rules and the Copeland rule.
2 Preliminaries
For each positive integer r ∈ N, we write [r] to denote the set {1, . . . , r}, and by [0] we mean the
empty set. For an event X, we write 1[X] to denote the indicator function such that 1[X] = 1 if X
occurs and 1[X] = 0 otherwise.
1One notable exception is the parameterization by the number of candidates [KKM17].
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Elections. An election E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V) consists of a set C of m candidates, a set V of n voters,
and the collection {≻v}v∈V of the voters’ preference orders. For each voter v, preference order ≻v
gives v’s ranking of the candidates from the most to the least desirable one. For a preference order
≻v, we write piv : [m] → C to denote a function such that piv(1) ≻v piv(2) ≻v · · · ≻v piv(m) (in
other words, piv(i) is the candidate that v ranks on the i-th position). Depending on the context,
we either specify voters’ preference orders directly or via the pi functions.
Given two candidates c, c′ ∈ C, we write Vc≻c′ to denote the set of all voters v ∈ V that prefer c
over c′.
Voting Rules. A voting rule R is a function that for each election E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V) outputs
the set R(E) ⊆ C of this election’s tied winners. We focus on the class of positional scoring rules
and on the Copeland rule.
Consider a setting with m candidates. Under a positional scoring rule Rw, we have a vector w =
(w1, . . . ,wm) ∈ Rm of point values associatedwith the candidate positions in the preference orders.
Each voter gives each candidate the number of points associated with this candidate’s position,
and the candidates with the highest total score are the winners. For example, the Plurality rule
uses vectors of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), the k-Approval rule uses vectors with k ones followed by
m− k zeros, and the Borda rule uses vectors of the form (m− 1, . . . , 2, 1, 0).
Given an election E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V), we sometimes speak of a positional scoring rule R(wv)v∈V ,
where each voter has a separate scoring vector wv = (wv1, . . . ,w
v
m). This is particularly useful, for
example, to model weighted elections, where each voter v has a positive integer weight ωv and
is treated as ωv copies of a unit-weight voter; then, instead of using some rule Rw and incorpo-
rating weights directly into our algorithms, we can use rule R(ωv·w)v∈V . As an added benefit, our
algorithms become more general. We will sometimes use ∆wv
ℓ
as a shorthand for wv
ℓ
−wv
ℓ+1.
The Copeland rule is based on the idea of pairwise elections among the candidates. Let E be an
election and let c, c′ be two candidates. By NE(c, c′) we mean the number of voters who prefer c
over c′, i.e., |Vc≻c′|. We say that a candidate c wins pairwise election against c′ if NE(c, c′) > NE(c′, c).
Similarly, we say that c ties (resp. loses) pairwise election against c′ if NE(c, c′) = NE(c′, c) (resp.
NE(c, c
′) < NE(c′, c)).
For α ∈ [0, 1], the Copelandα rule assigns to each candidate c one point for each candidate with
whom c wins a pairwise election, and α points for each candidate with whom c ties. Formally,
each candidate c receives |{c′ ∈ C \ {c} : NE(c, c′) > NE(c′, c)}| + α|{c′ ∈ C \ {c} : NE(c, c′) =
NE(c
′, c)}| points. The winners are all the candidates with the maximum score.
For a voting rule R, we write scE,R(c) to denote the score that candidate c receives in election E.
We sometimes drop the subscriptR when it is clear from the context.
Shift-Bribery. A SHIFT-BRIBERY instance I = (E, p,ψ) consists of an election E = (C,V,
{≻v}v∈V), a preferred candidate p ∈ C, and a collection ψ = {ψv}v∈V of the voters’ price functions.
Each voter v has the price function ψv : {0} ∪ [pi−1v (p) − 1] → R+0 ∪ {∞} and ψv(t) specifies the
cost of shifting the preferred candidate forward by t positions in v’s preference order. We require
that ψv(0) = 0 and that the function is non-decreasing (ψv(0) 6 ψv(1) 6 · · · 6 ψv(pi−1v (p)− 1)).
If ψv(t) = ∞ for some voter v and value t, then it is impossible to shift the preferred candidate
by t or more positions in the preference order of v. For an instance I, by ψmax(I) we denote
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the highest non-infinity price that occurs within I. We write ∆ψv(ℓ) and |I| as shorthands for
ψv(ℓ)− ψv(ℓ− 1) and mn, respectively.
A shift action s = (sv)v∈V for an instance I = (E, p,ψ) of SHIFT-BRIBERY is a vector of non-negative
integers such that for each voter v we have sv < pi
−1
v (p). Intuitively, this vector specifies for each
voter by how many positions we should shift the preferred candidate. We say that shift action s
consists of ∑v∈V sv unit shifts and we define its cost to be costI(s) = ∑v∈V ψv(sv). We denote the
election that results from applying s to E by shift(E, s); formally, shift(E, s) has the same voters
and candidates as E but for each voter v, if v’s preference order induced function piv in E then in
shift(E, s) it induces function pi′v such that:
pi′v(j) =


piv(j) if j < pi−1v (p)− sv,
p if j = pi−1v (p)− sv,
piv(j− 1) if pi−1v (p)− sv < j 6 pi−1v (p),
piv(j) if j > pi−1v (p).
Let R be a voting rule and let I be a SHIFT-BRIBERY instance with election E and preferred
candidate p. Shift action s is successful for I under R if p is an R-winner in shift(E, s), i.e., if
p ∈ R(shift(E, s)). R-SHIFT-BRIBERY is an optimization problem where, given a SHIFT-BRIBERY
instance I, we ask for a successful shift action with the lowest cost. We write OPT(I) to denote
this lowest cost.
Special Price Functions. There are two particularly interesting families of price functions. A
unit price function defines the cost of each unit shift to be one, i.e., if ψv is a unit price function
then ψv(ℓ) = ℓ for each legal shift value ℓ. An all-or-nothing price function is such that the cost of
shifting the preferred candidate is the same, irrespective by how many positions we shift him or
her. Formally, if ψv is an all-or-nothing price function then there is a value cv such that ψv(ℓ) = cv
for all positive integers ℓ that represent legal shifts (and, of course, ψv(0) = 0). An instance
I = (E, p,ψ) has (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices if it has all-or-nothing price functions and for each
voter v the value cv is in {1,∞}. Given such an instance I, we define its width to be the maximum
of pi−1v (p)− 1 over all v ∈ V such that cv = 1. In other words, it is the maximum number of unit
shifts possible to perform within a single vote by paying a unit of price. Another family of all-or-
nothing prices that we will discuss is the family of uniform-all-or-nothing prices, for which cv = 1
for all v ∈ V.
Linear Programming. In the LINEAR PROGRAMMING problem we are given an m × n matrix
A, an m-dimensional column vector b, an n-dimensional column vector c, and we ask for an n
dimensional column vector x that minimizes the value cTx subject to the condition that Ax > b.
A basic solution to such a problem is a solution x ∈ Rn such that there are n linearly independent
rows ai of A with aix = bi. It is known that when {x ∈ Rn : Ax > b} is feasible and bounded,
there always is a basic solution that achieves the optimum, and it can be computed up to an
arbitrary error in polynomial time (see, e.g., [LRS11] for the use of basic solutions in approximation
algorithms).
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3 Borda Rule
We now move on to our results. We first show approximation schemes for the case of the Borda
rule, mostly focusing on the case of unit prices. We start with Borda because it is one of the
simplest rules, for which we can present our ideas most clearly, and because it is a very practical
rule (in particular, relevant to various competitions).
3.1 Initial Observations
We first define two values that will guide our algorithms, and we explain their usefulness.
Definition 1 For an instance I = (E, p,ψ) of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY and a non-negative integer k, we
define:
max-diff (I) = max
c∈C
(scE(c)− scE(p)), and
sum-diff (I, k) = ∑
c∈C
max{0, scE(c)− scE(p)− k}.
The former value gives the score difference between the preferred candidate and his or her
strongest opponent, whereas the latter measures the total number of points that the non-preferred
candidates need to lose, provided that the preferred one gains k points.
Elkind et al. [EFS09] note that given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY, if K is the smallest
number of unit shifts in an optimal solution, then max-diff (I)/2 6 K 6 max-diff (I). Indeed,
if the preferred candidate gains max-diff (I) points then he or she certainly matches his or her
strongest opponent. On the other hand, the preferred candidate needs at least max-diff (I)/2 unit
shifts because each of them decreases the score difference between him or her and the strongest
opponent by at most two. However, it turns out that sum-diff (I, k) provides an even more useful
bound.
Lemma 2 Let I = (E, p,ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY, let s be a successful shift action for
I, and let ks be the number of unit shifts within s. Then, sum-diff (I, ks) 6 ks.
Proof. After applying s, the score of p is exactly scE(p) + ks. Thus each candidate c ∈ C
must have lost at least max{0, scE(c) − scE(p) − ks} points. This indeed means that
ks > ∑c∈Cmax{0, scE(c)− scE(p)− ks} = sum-diff (I, ks), as desired. 
We will also make use of the following subroutine, which is based on a simple dynamic program.
(Note that it is not restricted to unit prices.)
Lemma 3 There exists an algorithm that given an instance I = (E, p,ψ) of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY, a
subset C′ = {c1, . . . , ct} of t candidates from E, and a vector (s1, . . . , st) of non-negative integers, computes
a minimum cost shift action that ensures that each candidate ci loses at least si points. The algorithm runs
in polynomial time with respect to |I|+ ∏ti=1(si + 1).
Proof. Let the notation be as in the statement of the lemma, let m be the number of candidates in
E, and let V = (v1, . . . , vn) be the collection of voters in E.
We use dynamic programming with table DP of dimension (n+ 1)× (nm+ 1)× (s1 + 1)× · · · ×
(st + 1). The (i, j, r1, . . . , rt)-entry of the table stores the minimum cost of j unit shifts on voters
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v1, . . . , vi that jointly decrease the score of each ci by at least ri points. In the beginning, all the
entries are set to ∞, except the (0, 0, . . . , 0)-entry, which is set to zero.
Then we go through i = 1, . . . , n in the increasing order and for every entry of the form
(i, j, r1, . . . , rt), we compute its value using the following formula:
DP[i][j][r1 ] · · · [rt] =
min
ℓ6min{j,pi−1vi (p)−1}
(
ψvi(ℓ) +DP[i− 1][j− ℓ][max{0, r1 − b1}] · · · [max{0, rt − bt}]
)
,
where each bz := 1[0 < pi−1vi (p) − pi−1vi (cz) 6 ℓ] is the indicator variable specifying whether shift-
ing the preferred candidate p by ℓ positions within vote vi causes him or her to pass cz.
Finally, DP[n][nm][s1 ] · · · [st] gives the minimum cost of the desired shift action. 
3.2 A Combinatorial PTAS for Unit Prices
We now give a simple combinatorial PTAS for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices. The main
idea of our algorithm is as follows. If the optimal number of unit shifts needed is OPT, then, in
total, the scores of other candidates decrease by at most OPT. This means that, once we guess
OPT correctly, for each ε > 0 there can be at most 1/ε “bad” candidates, whose scores exceed that
of the preferred candidate by more than (1+ ε)OPT. Since there are only 1/ε such candidates,
we can use the algorithm from Lemma 3 to compute the cheapest set of (at most) OPT unit shifts
that ensure that the preferred candidate defeats these candidates. Then, we shift the preferred
candidate up further εOPT times, which ensures that p also defeats all the other candidates. In
total, we use only (1+ ε)OPT shifts and hence we arrive at our PTAS for the unit prices case. This
idea is formalized below.
Theorem 4 For each ε > 0, there exists an algorithm that given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY
with unit prices runs in time OPT(I)O(1/ε)poly(|I|) and outputs a successful shift action of cost at most
(1+ ε)OPT(I).
Proof. Let I = (E, p,ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY and let ε > 0 be the desired ap-
proximation ratio. For every k betweenmax-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I), such that sum-diff (I, k) 6 k,
we execute the following steps:
1. Let CkBAD = {c1, . . . , ct(k)} be the set of candidates whose scores are greater than scE(p) +
(1+ ε)k. We use the algorithm from Lemma 3 to find the least-cost shift action that decreases
the score of each c ∈ CkBAD by at least scE(c)− scE(p)− k points.
2. If the cost of this shift action is at most k, then we perform additional arbitrary unit shifts so
that the total number of unit shifts is ⌊(1+ ε)k⌋ or, if not enough unit shifts are possible, we
shift p to the top of every vote. We output all the performed unit shifts and terminate.
We first note that the algorithm indeed outputs a successful shift action. If p ends up being on top
of all the votes then he or she clearly wins. On the other hand, if the total number of unit shifts
performed is ⌊(1+ ε)k⌋, then the score of p is at least scE(p) + ⌊(1+ ε)k⌋; this means that, for all
the candidates c /∈ CkBAD, the new score of p is at least scE(c), which is at least as large as the score
of c after the shifts. Moreover, the algorithm from Lemma 3 ensures that after the shifts the score
of p is at least as high as the scores of all the candidates from CkBAD. Thus, p is a winner.
Next, let us argue that the algorithm computes a (1+ ε)-approximate solution. Recall that due to
the results of Elkind et al. [EFS09], the number of unit shifts in the optimal solution is between
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max-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I). Therefore the algorithm must terminate at latest when considering
k = OPT(I). Given this many shifts, it is—by definition—possible for p to obtain score higher than
all the candidates from CkBAD and, so, the algorithm from Lemma 3 returns a shift action with at
most OPT(I) unit shifts. Thus the algorithm terminates with at most ⌊(1+ ε)OPT(I)⌋ unit shifts.
The running time of the algorithm follows from Lemma 3 and is bounded by a polynomial in |I|
and Πc∈CkBAD(scE(c)− scE(p) − k+ 1) 6 (max-diff (I) + 1)
t(k) = OPT(I)O(t(k)). However, we only
invoke Lemma 3 when k > sum-diff (I, k). This means that:
k > sum-diff (I, k) = ∑
c∈C
max{0, scE(c)− scE(p)− k} > ∑
c∈CkBAD
(scE(c)− scE(p)− k) > t(k) · εk,
and we conclude that t(k) < 1/ε. Thus the running time is polynomial with respect to |I| +
OPT(I)O(1/ε). 
3.3 A Faster FPT Algorithm
Using a very similar reasoning as in Theorem 4, we obtain an FPT algorithm for Borda-SHIFT-
BRIBERY (with arbitrary price functions) parameterized by the smallest number K of unit shifts
in an optimal solution. While this case was already known to be in FPT, our algorithm runs in
2O(K)poly(|I|) time, which is faster than the known 2O(K2)poly(|I|)-time algorithm of Bredereck et
al. [BCF+16].
Theorem 5 There exists a 2O(K)poly(|I|)-time algorithm that can find an optimal solution to a given in-
stance I = (E, p,ψ) of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY where K is the smallest number of unit shifts in an optimal
solution.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4, our algorithm tries all the values of k between max-diff (I)/2
and max-diff (I) such that sum-diff E(I, k) 6 k. For such a k it proceeds as follows: (a) It forms the
set CkBAD = {c1, . . . , ct(k)} of all the candidates whose scores exceed scE(p) + k and (b) using the
algorithm from Lemma 3, it computes the cheapest shift bribery that consists of k unit shifts and
ensures that each candidate c in CkBAD loses at least scE(c)− scE(p)− k points. If such a shift action
exists then it stores it (note that all stored shift actions are successful). The algorithm outputs the
cheapest stored shift action.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the fact that when it considers the value of k = K,
then the algorithm from Lemma 3 indeed finds an optimal shift action.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in |I| and the values ∏t(k)i=1(scE(ci)− scE(p)− k+
1) for the values of k for which Lemma 3 is invoked. When sum-diff E(k) 6 k then the following
holds (the first inequality is due to the AM-GM inequality2 and the last one follows from the
Bernoulli’s inequality3):
t(k)
∏
i=1
(scE(ci)− scE(p)− k+ 1) 6
(
1
t(k)
·
t(k)
∑
i=1
(scE(ci)− scE(p)− k+ 1)
)t(k)
2The AM-GM inequality says that for non-negative numbers x1, . . . , xn we have
1
n (x1 + · · ·+ xn) > n
√
x1x2 · · · xn .
3For non-negative x and r between 0 and 1 we have (1+ x)r 6 1+ rx. In our case x = k/t(k) and r = t(k)/k; k > t(k)
because we need at least one unit shift for each candidate in CBAD.
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minimize ∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
x(v,j) s.t.:
0 6 x(v,1) 6 · · · 6 x(v,pi−1v (p)−1) 6 1 , ∀v ∈ V (1)
∑
v∈Vc≻p
x(v,pi−1v (c)) > scE(c)− scE(p)− k , ∀c ∈ C
k
BAD (2)
Figure 1: Program LP-U(I, k) from the proof of Lemma 6. For each voter v, we have variables x(v,1),
. . . , x(v,pi−1v (p)−1). Constraints (1) ensure that an integral solution describes a valid shift action and
Constraints (2) ensure that after applying such an action, each candidate in CkBAD has score no
higher than p; recall that Vc≻p means the set of voters that prefer c to p. The optimization goal is
to minimize the number of unit shifts in the shift action.
=
(
1
t(k)
· sum-diff E(k) + 1
)t(k)
6
(
1+
k
t(k)
)t(k)
=

(1+ k
t(k)
) t(k)
k

k 6 2k 6 2max-diff (I) 6 22K.
Thus the running time of our algorithm is polynomial in |I| and 2O(K), which suffices to complete
the proof. 
3.4 EPTAS for Unit Prices
The main result of this subsection is an EPTAS (efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme)
for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, that is, a PTAS for which the non-polynomial factors
in the running time depend only on the required approximation ratio. Note that in the algorithm
from Theorem 4 this factor was OPT(I)O(1/ε) and, thus, did not depend on ε alone.
On the technical level, we first develop an algorithm that for an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY
with unit prices outputs a solution with cost at most OPT(I) +
√
OPT(I). The general structure of
our algorithm is similar to that of the algorithm from Theorem 4, but instead of invoking Lemma 3,
we solve a linear program. We form this program in such a way that its basic solution has to consist
almost entirely of integral values. Then, rounding and complementing the obtained shift action
with arbitrary unit shifts gives the desired solution.
To state our linear program, we will model shift actions as boolean matrices (x(v,j))v∈V,j∈[m] such
that x(v,j) is 1 if after applying the shift action the preferred candidate is ranked on position j or
better in vote v, and it is 0 otherwise (so wewill always have 0 6 x(v,1) 6 x(v,2) 6 · · · 6 x(v,m) 6 1).
Formally, a shift action s = (sv)v∈V corresponds to the boolean matrix x(v,j) = 1[pi−1v (p) − sv 6
j].
Lemma 6 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with
unit prices, outputs a successful shift action with cost at most OPT(I) +
√
OPT(I).
Proof. Let I = (E, p,ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, where
E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V). We try all integers k between max-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I), such that
sum-diff (I, k) 6 k, and for each of them we perform the following steps:
1. We form the set CkBAD ⊆ C of those candidates c whose scores exceed value scE(p) + k+
√
k.
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2. We form the linear program LP-U(I, k) from Figure 1 and solve it for a basic solution (note
that the objective function gives the number of unit shifts used). If LP-U(I, k) is infeasible or
the cost of the solution exceeds k, then we skip this value of k. Let (xOPT
(v,j)
)v∈V,j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] be
the basic optimal solution found.
3. Let sLP be the shift action corresponding to (⌊xOPT
(v,j)
⌋)v∈V,j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]. (Note that the rounded
solution indeed correctly describes a shift action and that its cost, i.e., the number of unit
shifts it contains, is at most k.) Form a shift action s by extending sLP so that it contains
k+ ⌊
√
k⌋ unit shifts or, if this is impossible, then so that p is on the top of every preference
order. Output s and terminate.
Since finding basic solutions for linear programs can be done in polynomial time, the whole al-
gorithm runs in polynomial time. Further, the cost of the computed shift action s is at most
OPT(I) +
√
OPT(I) unit shifts. To see this, consider the stepwhen the algorithm tries k = OPT(I);
if it terminates earlier then our claim certainly is satisfied. For this value of k, LP-U(I, k) certainly
has a solution of cost at most k because an optimal successful shift action for I is one of its feasible
solutions. Thus the algorithm terminates for this value of k and (in Step 3) outputs a shift action
with at most OPT(I) +
√
OPT(I) unit shifts.
It remains to show that the computed shift action s is successful. If p ends up at the top of every
preference order, then surely s is a successful shift action. Let us consider the case where s consists
of exactly k+ ⌊
√
k⌋ unit shifts, i.e., where after applying s, p has score scE(p) + k+ ⌊
√
k⌋, for the
value of k for which the algorithm terminates. Since prior to applying s each candidate c /∈ CkBAD
had score at most scE(p) + k + ⌊
√
k⌋, after applying s candidate p certainly has score at least as
high as theirs. Thus we only need to show that each candidate in CkBAD also ends up with score at
most scE(p) + k+ ⌊
√
k⌋.
Let us say that a voter v ∈ V is integral if xOPT(v,j) ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ [pi−1v (p) − 1] and let Vint
be the set of all integral voters. Since (xOPT
(v,j)
)v∈V,j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] is a basic solution of LP-U(I, k), at
least ∑v∈V(pi−1v (p) − 1) inequalities must be tight. For each integral voter v, exactly pi−1v (p) − 1
inequalities of the form (1) are tight. On the other hand, for each non-integral voter v, at most
pi−1v (p) − 2 inequalities in (1) are tight. Further, there are |CkBAD| inequalities of the form (2) and
|CkBAD| 6 ⌊
√
k⌋, because each candidate c ∈ CkBAD contributes at least
√
k points to sum-diff (I, k)
and sum-diff (I, k) 6 k. Altogether, this means that there are at most ⌊
√
k⌋ non-integral voters, i.e.,
|V \ Vint| 6 ⌊
√
k⌋. Intuitively, each tight inequality of the form (2) can lead to at most a single
non-integral voter.
Rounding the basic solution into sLP can increase score difference between c and p by at most 1
for each non-integral voter (score of c is increasing and score of p is decreasing). Hence, in total,
after rounding the difference can be at most |V \Vint| 6 ⌊
√
k⌋. More formally, for each c ∈ CkBAD,
the score of c after applying sLP is as follows (for a number x, 0 6 x 6 1, by frac(x) we mean its
fractional part, so that if 0 6 x < 1 then frac(x) = x and if x = 1 then frac(x) = 0):
scE(c)− ∑
v∈Vc≻p
⌊
xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
⌋
= scE(c)− ∑
v∈Vc≻p
xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
+ ∑
v∈Vc≻p
frac
(
xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
)
(2)
6 scE(p) + k+ ∑
v∈Vc≻p
frac
(
xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
)
= scE(p) + k+ ∑
v∈Vc≻p\Vint
frac
(
xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
)
< scE(p) + k+ |V \Vint| 6 scE(p) + k+ ⌊
√
k⌋.
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This means that p is indeed a winner of the election. 
Using this algorithm and the combinatorial PTAS from Theorem 4, we obtain our EPTAS (in short,
if max-diff (I) < 2/ε2 then we run the algorithm from Theorem 4 and we run the algorithm from
Lemma 6 otherwise).
Theorem 7 There is an algorithm that, given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices and
a positive number ε > 0, runs in time 2O(log(1/ε)/ε)poly(|I|) and outputs a successful shift action of cost at
most (1+ ε)OPT(I).
Proof. Given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, our algorithm proceeds as
follows: If max-diff (I) < 2/ε2 then it runs the algorithm from Theorem 4 and, otherwise, if
max-diff (I) > 2/ε2, it runs the algorithm from Lemma 6. Then it returns the output from the
respective algorithm.
If max-diff (I) < 2/ε2, then OPT(I) < 2/ε2, which means that the algorithm from Theorem 4 runs
in time OPT(I)O(1/ε)poly(|I|) = 2O(log(1/ε)/ε)poly(|I|). Since the algorithm from Lemma 6 always
runs in time poly(|I|), we conclude that the above algorithm runs in time 2O(log(1/ε)/ε)poly(|I|).
When we run the algorithm from Theorem 4, the solution is always a (1+ ε)-approximation. On
the other hand, when we invoke Lemma 6, we have OPT(I) > max-diff (I)/2 > 1/ε2; hence, the
output is of cost at most OPT(I) +
√
OPT(I) = (1+OPT(I)−0.5)OPT(I) 6 (1+ ε)OPT(I). This
concludes the proof. 
Theorem 7 gives formal evidence that approximating Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY is computationally
easier for the case of unit prices than for the general case or, even, for the all-or-nothing prices case.
The latter cases are W[1]-hard when parameterized by the budget [BCF+16] and this means that
no EPTAS exists for them unless W[1] = FPT. If there were an EPTAS for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY
for the case of general prices, or for the all-or-nothing prices, which ran in time f (ε)nO(1), then
we could plug in ε = 1/(2B), where B would be the budget limit, and solve the problem exactly
in time f ( 12B )n
O(1), implying that W[1] = FPT. Such connections between FPT algorithms and
EPTASes are well-known in theoretical computer science [CT97], but, so far, have not found many
applications in computational social choice.
3.5 Uniform-All-or-Nothing Prices
In addition to the above PTASes, we devise a simple greedy algorithm that yields an asymptotic
1.5-approximation ratio for the special case of uniform-all-or-nothing prices. While this will be
subsumed by our PTAS in the next section, the simplicity of the algorithm may make it more
practical than the LP-based PTAS in Theorem 12. The main idea of our greedy algorithm is to
simply shift the preferred candidate p to the top in the votes where p is ranked lowest. The idea
is formalized below.
Theorem 8 There is a greedy algorithm that, given a Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY instance I with uniform-all-
or-nothing prices, outputs a successful shift action with cost at most (1.5 · OPT(I) + 1) in polynomial
time.
Proof. Let I = (E, p,ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with uniform-all-or-nothing prices,
where E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V). Let m be the number of candidates. Recall that for all-or-nothing
prices a solution is simply a set of bribed voters because we can move p to the tops of their prefer-
ence orders without additional cost.
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Our algorithm proceed as follows: As long as p is still not a winner, the algorithm bribes a voter
that ranks p on the lowest position. When the lowest position is at least three, ties are broken
arbitrarily. However, if the lowest position is two, then the algorithm breaks the ties by choosing
the voter whose top-ranked candidate has the highest score.
For each j, let Vj ⊆ V denote the set of the voters that rank p on position j. The key observation for
the analysis of our algorithm is that to obtain an optimal solution, it suffices to bribe all the voters
from Vm, then all the voters from Vm−1, and so on, until some value i, such that we only bribe a
subset of the voters from Vi. We formalize this observation in the following lemma.
Lemma 9 There exists an integer i > 2, an optimal solution W for I, and a set of voters Wi ⊆ Vi such that
W = (
⋃m
j=i+1Vj) ∪Wi.
Proof. Let W ′ be some optimal solution for I. As long as W ′ is still not in the required form, we
modifyW ′ as follows:
1. remove a voter inW ′ that ranks p on the highest position,
2. add a voter from V \W ′ that ranks p on the lowest position.
Note that in each step of this process the removed voter and the added voter are from different
Vi’s. Thus in each step we increase the final scores of some candidates by at most 1 (by canceling a
shift which decreased their scores) but we also increase the final score of p by at least 1. HenceW ′
remains an optimal solution after each step. It is also easy to see that the process terminates when
a solution is in the required form. y
Clearly, the greedy algorithm also first bribes all the voters in (
⋃m
j=i+1Vj) and it never bribes any
voter in Vi−1. The only difference between the greedy algorithm andW is in how they bribe voters
in Vi. To analyze this difference, let E
′ denote the election after all voters in (
⋃m
j=i+1Vj) are bribed.
Note that in E′ each voter ranks p among his or her top i candidates.
We consider two cases based on the value of i:
Case i = 2. In this case the greedy algorithm outputs an optimal solution because it bribes the
voters inV2 in an optimal order (the score of the candidate with the highest score is decreased
first, and so on).
Case i > 3. We claim that in this case the algorithm outputs a solution of cost at most ii−1 OPT(I)+
1; note that this immediately implies the approximation guarantee in Theorem 8. To see this,
observe that since W only bribes |Wi| voters in E′, every candidate c 6= p has his score
decreased by at most |Wi| points, whereas the score of our preferred candidate p increases
by exactly (i − 1) · |Wi| points. Since p wins the election after the voters in Wi are bribed,
we have scE′(c)− scE′(p) 6 i · |Wi|. Since every voter bribed in E′ by the greedy algorithm
increases the score of p by i− 1, p becomes a winner after at most ⌈ ii−1 · |Wi|⌉ voters in E′ are
bribed. In total, the greedy algorithm bribes at most ∑mj=i+1 |Vj|+ ⌈ ii−1 · |Wi|⌉ 6 ii−1 |W|+ 1 =
i
i−1 OPT(I) + 1 voters in E, as claimed.
Note that the greedy algorithm gives a solution of cost at most ii−1 OPT(I) + 1 for i defined in
Lemma 9. Hence, the worst guarantee, 1.5 ·OPT(I) + 1, is achieved for i = 3. 
We conclude this section by remarking that the Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY problem with uniform-all-
or-nothing prices was not known to be NP-hard before; specifically, Elkind et al. [EFS09] only
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minimize ∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · x(v,j) s.t.:
0 6 x(v,1) 6 · · · 6 x(v,pi−1v (p)−1) = x(v,pi−1v (p)) = · · · = x(v,m) = 1 , ∀v ∈ V (3)
scE(c)− ∑
v∈Vc≻p
∆wv
pi−1v (c)
· x(v,pi−1v (c)) 6 scE(p) + ∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆wvj · x(v,j) , ∀c ∈ C (4)
Figure 2: LP1 for the proof of Lemma 10. For each voter v, we have variables x(v,1), . . . , x(v,m). For
an integral solution, Constraints (3) ensure that the variables specify a shift action, Constraints (4)
ensure that this shift action is successful, and the optimization goal specifies its cost.
showed NP-hardness for (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices. Nevertheless, it is possible to (carefully)
modify the proof to yield NP-hardness for uniform-all-or-nothing prices as well. We provide the
full proof in Appendix A.
4 Positional Scoring Rules
In this section we give our main result: A PTAS for the case of SHIFT-BRIBERY with an arbitrary
positional scoring rule, whose scoring vectors are, possibly, different for different voters, and for
arbitrary prices. The algorithm and the proof is somewhat involved and we split its description
into two parts, by first deriving an algorithm with an additive error and then using it to form the
desired PTAS.
4.1 An Algorithm with Additive Error
The crucial part of our algorithm is an approximation algorithm that yields a good solution in the
case where ψmax(I), the highest non-infinite price in the instance, is small.
The main complication in the general prices case, as opposed to the unit prices case, is that the
cost of obtaining some k+ 1 points for the preferred candidate can be far larger than the cost of
obtaining k points. Thus the main trick used in the proofs from the previous section—deciding
up front how many more points than in an optimal solution the preferred candidate would get—
cannot be directly applied. We work around this problem by first solving a linear program which,
roughly speaking, for a given value ε > 0 tells us how many extra points the preferred candidate
needs to obtain so that he or she has score higher than all but at most 1/ε candidates. Then, using a
technique similar to the one we used for Lemma 6—in particular, solving a second linear program,
for which a basic solution contains a large number of integral variables—we find our approximate
solution.
Lemma 10 There is an algorithm that given ε > 0 and an instance I of R-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where R is
a given positional scoring rule with a possibly different scoring vector for each voter, outputs a successful
shift action for I of cost at most (1+ ε)OPT(I) + (1+ 1/ε)ψmax(I) and runs in time |I|O(1).
Proof. We first describe the somewhat non-intuitive algorithm, then we explain its workings and
argue why it produces the desired approximate solution. Let I = (E, p,ψ) be an instance of R-
SHIFT-BRIBERY, where E = (C,V) is an election, p is the preferred candidate, and ψ = {ψv}v∈V(E)
is a collection of price functions. Further, let R be a positional scoring rule specified via scoring
vectors (wv)v∈V (with one vector for each voter in V). Our algorithm proceeds as follows:
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minimize ∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · y(v,j) s.t.:
0 6 y(v,1) 6 · · · 6 y(v,jv−1) 6 y(v,jv) = · · · = y(v,m) = 1 , ∀v ∈ V (5)
scE(c)−∑v∈Vc≻p ∆wvpi−1v (c) · y(v,pi−1v (c)) 6 scE(p) + ∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆w
v
j · y(v,j), ∀c ∈ CBAD (6)
∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆w
v
j · y(v,j) > ∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆w
v
j · y∗(v,j) (7)
Figure 3: LP2 for the proof of Lemma 10. For each voter v, we have variables y(v,1), . . . , y(v,m). For
an integral solution, Constraints (5) ensure that the variables specify a shift action that pushes
p at least as far as shift action s∗ does, Constraints (6) ensure that p’s score at least matches the
scores of candidates in CBAD, and Constraint (7) ensures that p’s score is higher than the scores of
candidates not in CBAD.
1. We solve linear program LP1 from Figure 2. Let (xOPT
(v,j)
)v∈V,j∈[m] be the computed optimal
solution found for this program. Note that the value of the optimization goal for LP1 is at
most OPT(I), because this would be the cost of an optimal integral solution.
2. For every v ∈ V, j ∈ [m], we let y∗(v,j) = min{1, (1 + ε)xOPT(v,j)}, and we let jv ∈ [m] be the
smallest index such that y∗(v,jv) = 1. Intuitively, the shift action s
∗ that for each voter v shifts
p to position jv is our “first order approximation” of the shift action that we will eventu-
ally produce; its cost is at most (1+ ε)OPT(I) but after applying it, p’s score might still be
lower than that of some of the candidates. Formally, we define set CBAD to contain all the
candidates c such that:
scE(c)− ∑
v∈Vc≻p
∆wv
pi−1v (c)
· 1[pi−1v (c) > jv] > scE(p) +
(
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆wvj · y∗(v,j)
)
. (8)
On the left-hand side of the above equation, candidate c loses as many points as indicated
by shift action s∗, but the score of p, on the right-hand side, is computed with respect to the
possibly fractional values y∗(v,j).
3. We solve linear program LP2 from Figure 3 for an optimal, basic solution (yOPT
(v,j)
)v∈V,j∈[m]. We
output shift action s that corresponds to (⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉)v∈V,j∈[m].
The algorithm certainly runs in polynomial time. Let us now explain why the shift action that it
outputs indeed ensures that p is a winner. Foremost, due to Constraints (5), shift action s (weakly)
dominates s∗ (i.e., for each voter it shifts p at least as far as s∗ does). Thus, after applying s, each
opponent of pwho is not in CBAD has score at most as high as in the left-hand side of Equation (8).
Constraint (7) ensures that p obtains at least as high a score as on the right-hand side of Equation (8)
and, thus, p does not lose against any candidate not in CBAD. On the other hand, Constraints (6)
ensure that p does not lose against anyone in CBAD.
It remains to argue that costI(s) is at most as required in the lemma. To this end, we first claim
that |CBAD| < 1/ε.
Claim 11 |CBAD| < 1/ε.
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Proof. Consider any c ∈ CBAD. From the definition of CBAD, we have:
scE(p) +
(
∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆w
v
j · y∗(v,j)
)
<scE(c)−
(
∑v∈Vc≻p ∆w
v
pi−1v (c)
· 1[pi−1v (c) > jv]
)
.
On the other hand, from (4), we have:
scE(p) +
(
∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆w
v
j · xOPT(v,j)
)
>scE(c)−
(
∑v∈Vc≻p ∆w
v
pi−1v (c)
· xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
)
.
Subtracting the latter inequality from the former gives:
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆wvj · (y∗(v,j) − xOPT(v,j)) < ∑v∈Vc≻p ∆wvpi−1v (c) · (x
OPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
− 1[pi−1v (c) > jv]). (9)
We lower bound the left-hand side of the above as follows (the inequality follows because we
sum fewer non-negative terms, and the equality follows from the fact that for j < jv, we have
y∗(v,j) = (1+ ε)x
OPT
(v,j)
):
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆wvj · (y∗(v,j) − xOPT(v,j)) > ∑v∈V ∑j∈[jv−1] ∆wvj · (y∗(v,j) − xOPT(v,j))
= ε ∑v∈V ∑j∈[jv−1] ∆w
v
j · xOPT(v,j) .
We upper bound the right-hand side of (9) as follows, by dropping some possibly negative terms
and adding some non-negative ones:
∑
v∈Vc≻p
∆wv
pi−1v (c)
· (xOPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
− 1[pi−1v (c) > jv]) 6 ∑v∈V 1[pi−1v (c) < jv] · ∆wvpi−1v (c) · x
OPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
.
Plugging the above two inequalities back to (9), we get:
ε ∑v∈V ∑j∈[jv−1] ∆w
v
j · xOPT(v,j) < ∑v∈V 1[pi−1v (c) < jv] · ∆wvpi−1v (c) · x
OPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
.
Summing this over all candidates c ∈ CBAD, we have the following (the final equality follows by
replacing the summation over candidates c with a summation over positions j, j < jv where these
candidates are ranked):
|CBAD| · ε ∑v∈V ∑j∈[jv−1] ∆wvj · xOPT(v,j) < ∑c∈CBAD ∑v∈V 1[pi−1v (c) < jv] · ∆wvpi−1v (c) · x
OPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
6 ∑c∈C ∑v∈V 1[pi−1v (c) < jv] · ∆wvpi−1v (c) · x
OPT
(v,pi−1v (c))
= ∑v∈V ∑j∈[jv−1] ∆w
v
j · xOPT(v,j) .
In the above, the expression on the left-most side is of the form |CBAD| · ε times the expression on
the right-most side, so we get |CBAD| < 1/ε, as desired. y
We now proceed to bound costI(s). First, observe that an optimal integral solution for LP1 has cost
OPT(I) and, thus, for our optimal, but perhaps non-integral, solution (x(v,j))v∈V,j∈[m] we have:
∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j)xOPT(v,j) 6 OPT(I). (10)
For each voter v ∈ V, we say that v is integral if yOPT
(v,j)
∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ [m]. Let Vint denote
the set of all integral voters. Recall that (yOPT(v,j))v∈V,j∈[m] is a basic solution for LP2, meaning that
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exactly mn linearly independent inequalities must be tight (because we have mn variables).4 For
each non-integral voter v /∈ Vint, only at most m − 1 linearly independent inequalities in (5) are
tight. However, there are only 1+ |CBAD| < 1+ 1/ε inequalities of the form (6) and (7). From this,
we can conclude that less than 1+ 1/ε voters are not integral, i.e.:
|V \Vint| < 1+ 1/ε. (11)
As a result, we have that costI(s) equals:
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]
∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉
= ∑v∈Vint ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · yOPT(v,j) + ∑v∈V\Vint ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆ψv(pi−1v (p)− j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉.
Now, observe that the first summation on the right hand side is upper bounded by the optimum
of LP2. Note that (y∗(v,j))v∈V,j∈[m] is a solution to LP2. Hence, we have:
costI(s) 6 ∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · y∗(v,j)
+∑v∈V\Vint ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉
6 (1+ ε)∑v∈V ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · xOPT(v,j)
+∑v∈V\Vint ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉
(10)
6 (1+ ε)OPT(I) + ∑v∈V\Vint ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1]∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p)− j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉.
Now, observe that for each v ∈ V, if ∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆ψv(pi−1v (p) − j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉ is ∞, then OPT(I)
must also be ∞ and the inequality we try to prove is trivially true. Hence, we may assume that
∑j∈[pi−1v (p)−1] ∆ψv(pi
−1
v (p) − j) · ⌈yOPT(v,j)⌉ is finite; in this case, this quantity is bounded by ψmax(I).
As a result, we can further bound costI(s) by
costI(s) 6 (1+ ε)OPT(I) + |V \Vint| · ψmax(I)
(11)
6 (1+ ε)OPT(I) + (1+ 1/ε)ψmax(I),
which concludes our proof. 
4.2 The Final PTAS
Now we use the approximation algorithm with additive error to derive an approximation algo-
rithm with a purely multiplicative ratio. The intuition behind this process is simple: Since the al-
gorithm from Lemma 10 works well when ψmax(I) is small, we will first “preprocess” our instance
so that ψmax(I) is much smaller than OPT(I). To do so, note that if we consider an optimal shift
action sOPT, then there are only a few voters v such that ψv(sOPTv ) is large; specifically, for every
δ > 0, only at most 1/δ voters have ψv(sOPTv ) > δOPT(I). This means that if we guess such voters
and the numbers of unit shifts that we apply to them, then we can reduce the instance I to another
4We stress here that the inequalities must be linearly independent because in Constraint (5) we have equalities, each
defined by two linearly dependent inequalities; satisfying such an equality “counts” as only one tight inequality for a
basic solution.
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instance I ′, where ψmax(I ′) is bounded by δOPT(I). We then run the algorithm from Lemma 10
on I ′. By selecting δ = O(ε2), the additive error becomes O((δ/ε)OPT(I)) = O(εOPT(I)) as
intended.
Theorem 12 There is an algorithm that given ε > 0 and an instance I ofR-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where R is
a given positional scoring rule with a possibly different scoring vector for each voter, outputs a successful
shift action for I of cost at most (1+ ε)OPT(I) and runs in time |I|O(1/ε2).
Proof of Theorem 12. We are given an instance I = (E, p,ψ) ofR-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where E = (C,V)
is an election, p is the preferred candidate, ψ = {ψv}v∈V) is a collection of price functions, and R
is a positional scoring rule (possibly with a different scoring vector for each voter in V). We also
have ε > 0. Our algorithm works as follows:
1. Let δ = ε2/8 and q = ⌈1/δ⌉.
2. For every subset S ⊆ V of q voters and every possible shift action (sv)v∈S ∈ ({0} ∪ [m])S for
these voters, we execute the following steps:
(a) Compute b = minv∈S ψv(sv), the minimum cost among all shifts (sv)v∈S.
(b) Create new price functions {ψ′v}v∈V as follows. For all v ∈ S, let ψ′v(j) be 0 for j 6 sv
and let it be ∞ for the remaining values of j. For all v /∈ S, let ψ′v(j) = ψv(j) whenever
ψv(j) 6 b, and let ψ′v(j) = ∞ otherwise.
(c) Run the algorithm from Lemma 10 on the instance I ′ = (E, {ψ′v}v∈V) and ε/2.
3. Output the shift action with minimum cost among all shift actions produced by Step 2c.
First, notice that the algorithm runs in time |I|O(q) = |I|O(1/ε2) and that the algorithm outputs a
successful shift action (i.e., p is indeed a winner after the shifts).
To see that the cost of the output solution is at most (1+ ε)OPT(I), let us consider an optimal shift
action sOPT = (sOPTv )v∈V of I, i.e., we have costI(s) = OPT(I). Now, let S denote the set of q voters
whose shifts are the most expensive, i.e., S ⊆ V is the set of size q such that ψ(sOPTv ) > ψ(sOPTu ) for
all v ∈ S, u /∈ S. This set S and the shifts (sOPTv )v∈S are considered by the above algorithm. In this
case, observe that:
b = min
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v ) 6
1
q ∑
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v ) 6 δOPT(I). (12)
Observe also that ψmax(I ′) 6 b. Thus, Step 2c gives a shift action s∗ = (s∗v)v∈V such that:
costI′(s
∗) 6 (1+ ε/2)OPT(I ′) + (1+ 2/ε)b
(12)
6 (1+ ε/2)OPT(I ′) + εOPT(I)/2. (13)
Next, notice that:
OPT(I ′) 6 costI′(sOPT) = OPT(I)− ∑
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v ) (14)
and:
costI(s
∗) 6 costI′(s∗) + ∑
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v ). (15)
Combining (13), (14) and (15), we obtain the following bound on costI(s
∗):
costI(s
∗)
(15)
6 costI′(s
∗) + ∑
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v )
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(13)
6 (1+ ε/2)OPT(I ′) + εOPT(I)/2+ ∑
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v )
(14)
6 (1+ ε)OPT(I)− (ε/2) ∑
v∈S
ψv(s
OPT
v )
6 (1+ ε)OPT(I).
Hence, the output shift action has cost at most (1+ ε)OPT(I) as desired. 
We remark that as a corollary of Theorem 12, we also get a PTAS for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY for
arbitrary prices.
5 Copeland
For the case of Copelandα family of rules, we show that the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem is hard to
approximate even for the unit prices and for the all-or-nothing prices. Specifically, we show that an
approximation algorithm for the Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY implies an approximation algorithm
for the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem, which is believed to be hard to approximate [BCV+12].
Below we describe our results generally, and then we provide their proofs for respective types of
price functions in the following sections.
Definition 13 In the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH (DkS) problem, we are given an undirected graph G =
(VG, EG) and a positive integer k, and the goal is to output a k-vertex subgraph of G with as many edges as
possible.
Theorem 14 Let τ be an arbitrary non-decreasing function. If there is a polynomial time τ(|I|)-
approximation algorithm for Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY for some α ∈ [0, 1], for the case of unit prices or
all-or-nothing prices, then there is a polynomial time O(τ(|VG|O(1))2)-approximation algorithm for the
DkS problem.
Although hardness of approximation of DkS within up to polynomial factor is not known, inap-
proximability up to almost polynomial factor is known assuming the exponential time hypothesis
(ETH) and its gap version (Gap-ETH).5 Specifically, Manurangsi [Man17] has shown that under
the ETH assumption (the Gap-ETH assumption, respectively), DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH is hard to
approximate to within a factor of n1/poly(log log n) (no(1), respectively). Together with Theorem 14,
this implies the following corollary.
Corollary 15 Assuming ETH, for some constant c > 0 there is no polynomial-time |I|1/(log log |I|)c-
approximation algorithm for Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY for any α > 0, even for unit prices or
all-or-nothing prices. Moreover, assuming Gap-ETH, the inapproximability ratio can be improved to
|I| f (|I|) for any function f = o(1).
For the parameterization by the number of unit shifts, assuming Gap-ETH implies that there is no
FPT approximation scheme for the problem even for the case of unit prices.
Theorem 16 Assuming Gap-ETH, for every α ∈ [0, 1], every ε > 0, and every computable function T,
there is no algorithm that given a Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY instance I with unit prices, runs in time
T(OPT(I)) · poly(|I|) and outputs a successful shift action with at most (2− ε)OPT(I) unit shifts.
5ETH [IP01, IPZ01] states that there is no subexponential time algorithm that solves 3SAT. Gap-ETH [Din16, MR17]
states that no subexponential time algorithm can distinguish between a satisfiable 3CNF formula and one which is only
(1− δ)-satisfiable for some absolute constant δ > 0.
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We are not aware of a constant factor FPT approximation algorithms for the problem and it is
possible that the factor 2 above can be improved to larger constants, or even beyond a constant.
This remains an interesting open question.
Another parameter that has been considered in the literature is the number of affected voters.
For this parameter, the exact version is known to be W[2]-hard (for both unit prices and all-or-
nothing prices) by a reduction from k-Set Cover [BCF+16]. Due to the recent developments in
parameterized inapproximability of k-Set Cover [CL16, CLM18], we canmodify theW[2]-hardness
proof to yield strong parameterized inapproximability results for Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with
this parameter.
Theorem 17 For every α ∈ [0, 1], every ε > 0, Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY parameterized by the number
of affected voters is W[1]-hard to approximate to within any constant factor, even for unit prices or (1,∞)-
all-or-nothing prices.
Notice that the hardness in Theorem 17 is stronger than Theorem 16 both in terms of the approx-
imation ratio and that it requires weaker assumption. We also remark here that, for (1,∞)-all-or-
nothing prices, the optimum is exactly equal to the number of affected voters. Hence, the hardness
above carries over to the “budget” parameter as well. To summarize, our results implies inapprox-
imability for essentially all parameters left open by [BCF+16].
5.1 Additional Notation and Tools
We need some additional notation in the following text. Let C be a set of candidates. We write 〈C〉
to denote an arbitrary (but fixed) preference order over C, and for each A ⊆ C, by 〈A〉 we mean
〈C〉 restricted to the candidates from A. For example, for C = {a, b, c, d, e} and A = {a, b, c} we
may write d ≻ 〈A〉 ≻ e to denote preference order where d is ranked ahead of all the members of
A, and e is below all members of A (and below d, of course). When we use this notation to specify
a preference order, typically the ranking of candidates within 〈A〉 is irrelevant for the argument.
For each A ⊆ C, we write←−〈A〉 to denote the reverse of the order 〈A〉.
In Definition 13 we have defined the optimization variant of the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem.
In the decision variant, an instance consists of a graph G and two positive integers, k and t, and
we ask if it is possible to select k vertices that jointly induce a graph with at least t edges.
Given a graph G = (VG, EG) and a set of verticesU ⊆ VG, by EG[U]wemean the set of edges from
EG that have both endpoints in U.
Often, when constructing hard instances for Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY, we want to create addi-
tional voters and candidates so that the candidates of our interest have certain scores and certain
outcomes of pairwise elections. The following proposition is especially useful for this purpose;
it is extracted from the proof of Theorem 4 of [BCF+16] with slight modifications. We provide a
proof for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 18 (Bredereck et al. [BCF+16]) Let C be a candidate set that can be partitioned into A ∪
B∪ {p, d}, where |A|+ |B| is an odd integer, and let a, b be non-negative integers such that a 6 |B|. Then,
there exists an election E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V) with |V| = 2|A|+ 2|B|+ 2b+ 5 such that:
1. p loses pairwise elections against every candidate in A by 2b+ 1 votes,
2. p receives |B| − a+ 1 points (with respect to the Copelandα rule),
3. d receives |B| points, and
4. every candidate in A ∪ B receives at most (|A|+ |B|+ 3)/2 points.
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(Note here that, since |C| is an odd integer, there are no ties in pairwise elections.)
Proof of Proposition 18. The construction here is a slight adaptation of the construction given in the
proof of Theorem 4 by Bredereck et al. [BCF+16]. For convenience, let us define some additional
notation (also due to Bredereck et al. [BCF+16]): For any set T = {c1, . . . , c|T|} of an odd number
of candidates and any ci ∈ T, we define half-seq1(T, ci) and half-seq2(T, ci) as the preferences
orders:
ci ≻ 〈Ti〉 ≻ 〈T \ Ti〉 and
←−−−−〈T \ Ti〉 ≻ ci ≻
←−〈Ti〉
respectively, where Ti = {ci+1, . . . , ci+(|T|−1)/2}; here we use the convention that c|T|+j = cj. The
key property here is that if there is one voter with a preference order that includes half-seq1(T, ci)
and one with a preference order that includes half-seq2(T, ci), then ci wins pairwise election
against exactly half of the candidates in T \ {ci} (i.e. those in Ti) and ties with the rest. All other
pairwise elections not involving ci result in ties.
Let S ⊆ B be any subsets of B of size a. For our election E, we create the following voters:
1. One voter with preference order 〈A ∪ B〉 ≻ p ≻ d.
2. b pairs of voters with preference orders 〈A〉 ≻ p ≻ 〈B〉 ≻ d and d ≻ ←−〈B〉 ≻ ←−〈A〉 ≻ p.
3. Two voters with preference orders d ≻ 〈B〉 ≻ 〈A〉 ≻ p and p ≻ ←−〈A〉 ≻ d ≻ ←−〈B〉.
4. Two voters with preference orders p ≻ 〈B \ S〉 ≻ 〈S〉 ≻ 〈A〉 ≻ d and d ≻ ←−〈A〉 ≻ ←−〈S〉 ≻ p ≻←−−−−〈B \ S〉.
5. For every candidate c ∈ A ∪ B, two voters with preference orders half-seq1(A ∪ B, c) ≻ p ≻
d and d ≻ p ≻ half-seq2(A ∪ B, c).
It is simple to verify that (i) p loses pairwise elections against every candidate in A by 2b + 1
votes, (ii) p wins pairwise elections exactly against the candidates in the set {d} ∪ (B \ S), (iii) d
wins pairwise elections exactly with the candidates from B, and (iv) each candidate in A ∪ B wins
pairwise elections against exactly half of the other candidates in A ∪ B. These four features of E
indeed imply the claimed properties in the statement of the proposition. 
5.2 All-or-Nothing Prices
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 14 for the case of all-or-nothing prices. To this end, we
focus on the next lemma, from which the desired result follows. The proof is similar to the W[1]-
hardness proof of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY of Bredereck et al. [BCF+16] except that the roles of
edges and vertices are reversed.
Lemma 19 For each α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a reduction that takes in a DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH instance
(G, k, t) and outputs an instance I of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices of width
|VG| (where VG is the set of G’s vertices) such that the following holds for every 0 < δ 6 1:
1. (Completeness) If there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with t edges, then OPT(I) 6 k.
2. (Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δt edges, then OPT(I) > (k −
1)/
√
δ.
Moreover, the reduction runs in poly(|VG|, t) time.
Proof. Consider an instance (G, k, t) of the decision variant of the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem,
where G = (VG, EG) is a graph and k, t are two integers. Our reduction forms an instance I =
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(E,ψ, p) of the Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY problem, with election E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V).. We set
C = EG ∪D ∪ {p, d}, where D is a set of |EG|+ 5 dummy candidates, p is the preferred candidate,
and d will be the unique winner of the election prior to shifting p. The voters are constructed as
follows (for a vertex u, by ΓG(u) we mean the set of edges incident to it):
1. For each vertex u ∈ VG, we create two voters, vu and v′u, such that the preference order of vu
is: 〈
ΓG(u)
〉 ≻vu p ≻vu 〈C \ ({p} ∪ ΓG(u))〉 .
and the preference order of v′u is its reverse. The cost of each of the possible shifts for vu is
one, i.e., ψvu(1) = · · · = ψvu(|ΓG(u)|) = 1, whereas the cost of each of the possible shifts for
v′u is infinity, i.e., ψv′u(1) = · · · = ψv′u(|C| − 1− |Γ(u)|) = ∞.
2. We invoke Proposition 18 with A = EG, B = D, b = 1 and a = t+ 1 and create polynomially
many additional voters so that p loses pairwise elections against every candidate in EG by 3
votes, scE(p) = |D| − t, scE(d) = |D| and, for all c ∈ EG ∪ D, scE(c) 6 (|EG|+ |D|+ 3)/2 <
|D|. Note that it is possible to obtain these scores via Proposition 18 because for each vertex
u, the preference orders of vu and v
′
u cancel each other out. For these voters, let the price of
all the possible shifts be infinity.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists a set U ⊆ VG of k vertices that induces a graph with
at least t edges. Consider a shift action where for each u ∈ V we shift p to the first position in
the preference order of vu. Clearly, this shift action is of cost k. Moreover, for each edge e =
{u1, u2} ∈ EG[U], the shifts switch the ranks of e and p in two preference orders, those of vu1
and vu2 . Since in the original election p was losing the pairwise election against e by 3 votes,
after the shifts p wins this pairwise election. As a result, after the shifts the score of p is at least
|D| − t+ |EG[U]| > |D| = scE(d). Hence, p is a winner of the election.
(Soundness) Suppose contrapositively that OPT(I) 6 (k− 1)/√δ. Suppose that s = (sv)v∈V is a
successful shift action with cost OPT(I). Since we have all-or-nothing prices, we can assume that
for every vote where s shifts p, it shifts him or her to the top position in the vote. Note that no
shift action of finite cost can change the score of d. As a result, pmust end up having score at least
|D|. Observe also that for each vote, no shift action of finite cost can change the relative order of p
and any of the candidates in D. This implies that after applying s, p must win pairwise elections
against at least t candidates in EG; let Y ⊆ EG denote the set of these edges.
Now, let U ⊆ V denote the set of all u ∈ VG such that at least one unit shift is applied to vu (i.e.,
svu > 0). Note that |U| = OPT(I) 6 (k− 1)/
√
δ. Furthermore, it is not hard to see that each edge
e = {u1, u2} ∈ EG loses pairwise election against p if and only if U contains both u1 and u2. In
other words, we have
∣∣EG[U]∣∣ = |Y| > t. Let U′ be a random subset of U of size k (or U′ = U
when |U| < k). The expected number of edges induced by U′ is:
E
[∣∣EG[U′]∣∣] = ∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
{u,v}∈EG
1
2
Pr
[
u ∈ U′ ∧ v ∈ U′]
=
( |U|k−2)
(|U|k )
· ∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
{u,v}∈EG
1
2
=
k(k− 1)
|U|(|U| − 1) ·
∣∣EG[U]∣∣ > k(k− 1)(k− 1)2/δ · t > δt.
As a result, there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with δt edges, which concludes our proof. 
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5.3 Unit Prices
The unit prices part of Theorem 14 is established via a reduction from the all-or-nothing price case;
we state the reduction in the general form below as it will be used again in the next section.
Lemma 20 For every α ∈ [0, 1] and B, B′ ∈ N such that B 6 B′, there exists a poly(|I|, B, B′)-time
algorithm that takes in an instance I of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices of
width b and produces an instance I ′ of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, such thatmin{B′, B ·
OPT(I)} 6 OPT(I ′) 6 (B+ b) ·OPT(I). Moreover, when B > b ·OPT(I), any minimum cost success-
ful shift action in I ′ affects only OPT(I) voters.
Proof. Let the notation be as in the statement of the theorem and let E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V) be
the election from instance I. We assume without loss of generality that |V| > 3. We form an
election E′ = (C′,V, {≻′v}v∈V) with the same voters (but with modified preference orders), and
with candidate set C′ = C ∪ D, where D is the set of additional (B+ B′) · |V| “filler candidates”.
Let {Dv}v∈V be a collection of disjoint subsets of D such that |Dv| = B if it costs one to shift p in
v’s preference list and |Dv| = B′ otherwise. For each voter v ∈ V, his or her preference order ≻′v
in E′ is:
piv(1) ≻′v · · · ≻′v piv(pi−1v (p)− 1) ≻′v 〈Dv〉 ≻′v p
≻′v piv(pi−1v (p) + 1) ≻′v · · · ≻′v piv(|C|) ≻′v 〈D \ Dv〉 .
In other words, we add the filler candidates from Dv right in front of p, and we put the rest of
the filler candidates at the end of the list. Note that each filler candidate from D loses pairwise
election to each candidate from C. We form an instance I ′ = (E′, p,ψ′), where ψ′ are unit prices.
It is not hard to check that if a shift action s ∈ NV0 is successful for I, then the shift action s′ ∈ NV0
defined by:
s′v =
{
0 if sv = 0,
B+ pi−1v (p)− 1 if sv > 0,
is successful for I ′. Moreover, since I uses (1,∞)-all-or-nothing price functions of width b, the cost
incurred by s′ for each voter is at most (B+ b) times the original cost of that voter in s. As a result,
we have OPT(I ′) 6 (B+ b) ·OPT(I) as desired.
Next, we show that OPT(I ′) > min{B ·OPT(I), B′}. Suppose that OPT(I ′) < B′; we will show
that OPT(I ′) > B ·OPT(I). Consider any shift action s′ ∈ NV0 with cost OPT(I ′) (with respect to
the instance I ′) that is successful for I ′. We define s ∈ NV0 by:
sv =
{
0 if s′v 6 |Dv|,
s′v − |Dv| if s′v > |Dv|.
It is simple to see that s is successful for I. Moreover, since OPT(I ′) < B′ and for each voter v ∈ V
such that the cost of shifting p in v is ∞ (in terms of the instance I) we have that |Dv′ | = B′, we
see that s does not contain infinity-priced shifts (in terms of I). Finally, for every voter v such that
sv > 0, we have s
′
v > B. This means that the cost of s (in terms of I) is at most OPT(I
′)/B. Hence,
B ·OPT(I) 6 OPT(I ′) as desired.
Lastly, suppose that B > b ·OPT(I). Consider any minimum cost successful shift action s′ of I ′; we
might assumewithout loss of generality that s′v is either zero or at least B. Otherwise, if 0 < s′v < B,
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we can change s′v to zero, which retains p as a winner and also reduces the cost. From this, we
have that the number of affected voters in s′ is at most
OPT(I ′)
B
6
(B+ b) ·OPT(I)
B
< OPT(I) + 1.
In other words, s′ affects at most OPT(I) voters, which concludes our proof. 
We can now prove the desired inapproximability of Copelandα for unit prices, by simply apply-
ing Lemmas 19 and 20 together with appropriate values of B and B′. This idea is formalized
below.
Lemma 21 For each α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a reduction that takes in a DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH instance
(G, k, t) and outputs an instance I ′ of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices such that the following
holds for every 0 < δ 6 1 (VG is the set of vertices for G):
1. (Completeness) If there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with t edges, then OPT(I ′) 6 2|VG| · k.
2. (Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δt edges, then OPT(I ′) > |VG |(k−1)√
δ
.
Moreover, the reduction runs in poly(|VG|, t) time.
Proof. Let (G, k, t) be our input instance of DkS, where G = (VG, EG) is a graph, k is the number
of vertices we can select, and t is the lower bound on the required number of edges in the graph
induced by the selected vertices. The reduction proceeds as follows. First, we apply Lemma 19 to
produce an instance I. Then, we invoke Lemma 20 with B = |VG| and B′ = |VG|4 + 1 to produce
an instance I ′, which we output. The reduction runs in polynomial time.
(Completeness) If there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with t edges, then Lemma 19 ensures that
OPT(I) 6 k. Moreover, Lemma 20 then ensures that OPT(I ′) 6 (|VG| − 1 + |VG|)OPT(I) 6
2|VG| · k.
(Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δt edges, then Lemma 19 implies
that OPT(I) > (k − 1)/√δ. Then, Lemma 20 ensures that OPT(I ′) > min{B′, B · OPT(I)} >
min{|VG|4, |VG|(k− 1)/
√
δ} > |VG|(k− 1)/
√
δ. (The last inequality holds because we can assume
w.l.o.g. that δ > 1/t and that t 6 k2 6 |VG|2.) 
5.4 FPT Inapproximability Results
In this section we show that approximating Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY is difficult even for FPT
algorithms, for the parameterizations by the number of unit shifts and by the number of affected
voters.
5.4.1 Parameterization by the Number of Unit Shifts
We first show FPT inapproximability of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, parameter-
ized by the number of unit shifts (Theorem 16). To do so, let us recall the following hardness
result regarding distinguishing a graph with a k-clique and one in which every k-vertex subgraph
is sparse, as proved by Chalermsook et al. [CCK+17] (which, in turn, relies heavily on the reduc-
tion and the main lemma of Manurangsi [Man17]).
Theorem 22 (Chalermsook et al. [CCK+17]) Assuming Gap-ETH, for every computable function T
and every constant δ ∈ (0, 1), there is no algorithm that, given a graph G = (VG, EG) and an integer
k, can distinguish between the following two cases in time T(k) · |VG|O(1):
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1. (Yes) There exists a k-clique in G.
2. (No) Every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δ · (k2) edges.
In Lemma 23, we give a reduction from the above problem to Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with
unit prices, parameterized by the number of unit shifts (i.e., parameterized by the value of an
optimal solution). Together with Theorem 22, this reduction implies Theorem 16 (by selecting
δ = ε/2).
Lemma 23 For every α ∈ [0, 1] and every constant δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a polynomial time reduction
that takes in a graph G and a positive integer k, and outputs an instance I ′ of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY
with unit prices such that the following holds (where R = ⌈4/δ⌉+ 2):
1. (Completeness) If there exists a k-clique in G, then OPT(I ′) 6 R · (k2).
2. (Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δ(k2) edges, then OPT(I
′) > R(2−
2δ)(k2).
Before we proceed, we note that the reduction from the previous section does not work in the
parameterized context. The reason is that the optimum there depends on |VG|, whereas here we
would like the optimum to be bounded from above by some function of k. Instead, we turn
to the reduction used by Bredereck et al. [BCF+16] to prove W[1]-hardness of the problem; we
only make slight modifications to the reduction so that the analysis goes through even for the
inapproximability proof. Once again, we describe this reduction in two steps, by first reducing
to Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices and then applying Lemma 20 to
obtain an instance with unit prices.
Lemma 24 For every α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a polynomial time reduction that takes in a graph G and
a positive integer k and outputs an instance I of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing
prices of width 2, such that the following holds for every 0 < δ 6 1:
1. (Completeness) If there exists a k-clique in G, then OPT(I) 6 (k2).
2. (Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δ(k2) edges, then OPT(I) > (2−
δ)(k2).
Proof. Our input consists of graph G = (VG, EG) and positive integer k. We create an instance
I = (E, p,ψ) of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V) is an election, p is the
preferred candidate, and ψ = (ψv)v∈V is a collection of price functions. We let C = VG ∪D∪{p, d},
where D consists of additional |VG| + 5 dummy candidates and d is a candidate who will be a
winner in E (prior to shifting p). We form the voter collection, together with their preference
orders and price functions, as follows:
1. For each edge e = {u1, u2} ∈ EG, we create two voters, ve and v′e, such that the preference
order of ve is:
u1 ≻ve u2 ≻ve p ≻ve 〈C \ {p, u1, u2}〉 ,
and the preference order of v′e is the reverse of that of ve. The cost of the two possible shifts
for ve are ones, i.e., ψve(1) = ψve(2) = 1, whereas the cost of all possible shifts for v
′
e are
infinity, i.e., ψv′e(1) = · · · = ψv′e(|C| − 3) = ∞.
2. We invoke Proposition 18 with A = VG, B = D, b = k − 2 and a = k + 1 to create poly-
nomially many additional voters so that p loses pairwise elections against every candidate
in VG by 2k − 3 votes, scE(p) = |D| − k, scE(d) = |D| and, for all c ∈ VG ∪ D, scE(c) 6
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(|VG| + |D| + 3)/2 < |D|. Note that we can use Proposition 18 to obtain these scores be-
cause for each edge e, the preference orders of ve and v
′
e cancel each other out. For all these
voters, let the price of all possible shifts be infinity.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists a set U ⊆ VG of k vertices that induces a k-clique. Con-
sider a shift action where for each edge e ∈ EG[U], we shift p to the first position in the preference
order of ve. Clearly, this solution is of cost (
k
2). Moreover, for each vertex u ∈ U, the shifts switch
the ranks of u and p in the preference orders of (k − 1) voters corresponding to all the edges in-
cident to u. Since in the original election p was losing the pairwise election against u by 2k − 3
voters, p wins the pairwise election against u after the shifts. As a result, after the shifts the score
of p is at least |D| − k+ |U| = |D|, which is at least as high as the score of d (note that our shifts
did not change d’s score). Hence, p is a winner of the election.
(Soundness) Suppose contrapositively that OPT(I) 6 (2− δ)(k2). Suppose that s = (sv)v∈V is a
successful shift action with cost OPT(I). Since we have all-or-nothing prices, we can assume that
for every vote where s shifts p, it shifts him or her to the top position in the vote. Note that no shift
action of finite cost can change the score of d. As a result, p must end up having score at least |D|.
Observe also that no shift action of finite cost affects the relative order of p and any candidate from
D. This implies that, after applying s, p must win pairwise elections against at least k candidates
in VG; let U ⊆ VG denote the set of k candidates that p ends up wining pairwise elections against.
(If p wins against more than k such candidates in VG then pick k of them arbitrarily.)
Now, let E∗ ⊆ EG denote the set of all edges e ∈ EG such that at least one unit shift is applied to ve
(i.e., sve > 0). Note that |E∗| = OPT(I) 6 (2− δ)(k2). Now, let us consider each vertex candidate
v ∈ U. Since p loses pairwise election against u by 2k − 3 votes in E, but ends up winning the
pairwise election after applying s, it must be that applying s puts p ahead of u in at least k − 1
preference orders. More formally, this means that:
k− 1 6 ∑
e∈E∗
1[u ∈ e].
Summing the above inequality over all u ∈ U gives:
2
(
k
2
)
6 ∑
u∈U
∑
e∈E∗
1[u ∈ e] = ∑
e∈E∗
|e ∩U|
6
(
∑
e∈(E∗∩EG [U])
2
)
+
(
∑
e∈(E∗\EG[U])
1
)
= 2|E∗ ∩ EG[U]|+ (|E∗| − |E∗ ∩ EG[U]|)
= |E∗|+ |E∗ ∩ EG[U]| 6 (2− δ)
(
k
2
)
+ |EG[U]|,
which implies that |EG[U]| > δ(k2). That is, the subgraph of G induced by U is a k-vertex subgraph
with at least δ(k2) edges, which concludes our proof. 
We are ready to prove Lemma 23, which in turn gives Theorem 16.
Proof of Lemma 23. Let graph G = (VG, EG) and positive integer k be our input. We first apply
Lemma 24 to produce an instance I of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices
24
and, then, we invoke Lemma 20 with B = ⌈4/δ⌉ and B′ = B(|VG|4 + 1) to produce an instance I ′
with unit price functions. The reduction runs in polynomial time.
(Completeness) If G contains a k-clique, then Lemma 24 ensures that OPT(I) 6 (k2). Moreover,
Lemma 20 then ensures that OPT(I ′) 6 (B+ 2)OPT(I) 6 R(k2), where R = B+ 2 = ⌈4/δ⌉+ 2, as
desired.
(Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δ(k2) edges, then Lemma 24 im-
plies that OPT(I) > (2− δ)(k2). Lemma 20 then ensures that:
OPT(I ′) > min{B′, B ·OPT(I)} > B(2− δ)
(
k
2
)
> R (1− δ/2) (2− δ)
(
k
2
)
> R(2− 2δ)
(
k
2
)
.
This completes the proof. 
5.4.2 Parameterization by the Number of Affected Voters
We now move on to the parameterization by the number of affected voters (Theorem 17). Our
result will rely on the recent parameterized hardness of approximation result for Set Cover, due
to Chen and Lin [CL16]. Before we state their result, let us briefly recall the (Minimum) Set Cover
problem. An instance (U,S) of Set Cover consists of the universe U = {u1, . . . , uN} and a collec-
tion S = {S1, . . . , SM} of subsets of U. The goal is to find a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S of smallest size
such that
⋃
S∈S ′ S = U. The result of Chen and Lin can be stated as follows:
Theorem 25 (Chen and Lin [CL16]) Set Cover isW[1]-hard to approximate to within any constant fac-
tor when parameterized by the optimal solution size.
We note that the above result has been qualitatively strengthened by Karthik et al. [CLM18]. In-
deed, if we were interested in getting a super-constant hardness of approximation result, or a tight
running-time lower bound, the latter would give a better result. However, we choose to state our
hardness as simply as possible (i.e., as Theorem 17) and, hence, it suffices to start from the result
of Chen and Lin [CL16].
Similarly to our previous results, we prove Theorem 17 in two steps. First, by reducing Set Cover
to Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices, as stated below, and then by using
Lemma 20.
Lemma 26 There is a polynomial time reduction that takes as input an instance I˜ = (U,S) of Set
Cover and produces an instance I of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices such
that OPT(I) = OPT( I˜).
Note that the above lemma, togetherwith Theorem 25, immediately yields hardness in Theorem17
for (1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices. The proof of Lemma 26 is similar to the previous proofs except that
now (some) voters correspond to the subsets and (some) candidates correspond to the elements
of the universe; this can be seen as a modification of the W[2]-hardness proof of Bredereck et
al. [BCF+16].
Proof of Lemma 26. We are given an instance I˜ = (U,S) of Set Cover where U = {u1, . . . , uN}
and S = {S1, . . . , SM}. We create an instance I = (E, p,ψ) of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where
E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V) is an election, p is the preferred candidate, and ψ = (ψv)v∈V is a collection
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of price functions. We let C = U ∪ D ∪ {p, d}, where D consists of additional N + 5 dummy
candidates and d is a candidate who will be a winner in E (prior to shifting p). We form the voter
collection, together with their preference orders and price functions, as follows:
1. For each subset S ∈ S , we create two voters, vS and v′S, such that the preference order of vS
is:
〈S〉 ≻vS p ≻vS 〈C \ ({p} ∪ S)〉 ,
and the preference order of v′S is the reverse of that of vS. The cost of the all possible shifts
for vS are ones, i.e., ψvS(1) = · · · = ψvS(|S|) = 1, whereas the cost of all possible shifts for v′S
are infinity, i.e., ψv′S(1) = · · · = ψv′S(|C| − |S| − 1) = ∞.
2. We invoke Proposition 18 with A = U, B = D, b = 0 and a = N + 1 to create polynomially
many additional voters so that p loses pairwise elections against every candidate in U by 1
vote, scE(p) = |D| − N, scE(d) = |D| and, for all c ∈ U ∪ D, scE(c) 6 (|U|+ |D|+ 3)/2 <
|D|. Note that we can use Proposition 18 to obtain these scores because for each S ∈ S , the
preference orders of vS and v
′
S cancel each other out. For all these voters, let the price of all
possible shifts be infinity.
Clearly the reduction runs in polynomial time. We next argue that OPT(I) = OPT( I˜).
To do so, let us first argue that OPT(I) 6 OPT( I˜). Let S ′ ⊆ S be such that |S ′| = OPT( I˜) and⋃
S∈S ′ S = U. Consider a shift action that shifts p to the first position in the preference order of vS
for all S ∈ S ′. This shift action is of cost OPT( I˜). Moreover, since ⋃S∈S ′ S = U, this shift action
switches the rank of p and u in at least one voter for each u ∈ U. Since p was losing the pairwise
election against u by one vote, p wins the pairwise election after the shifts. Hence, the score of p
after the shifts become |D| − N + N = |D|, which is at least as high as the score of d (note that our
shifts did not change d’s score). Hence, p is a winner of the election after the shifts, which implies
that OPT(I) 6 OPT( I˜) as desired.
Finally, we argue that OPT(I) > OPT( I˜). Suppose that s = (sv)v∈V is a successful shift action
with cost OPT(I). Since we have all-or-nothing prices, we can assume that for every vote where s
shifts p, it shifts him or her to the top position in the vote. Note that no shift action of finite cost
can change the score of d. As a result, p must end up having score at least |D|. Observe also that
no shift action of finite cost affects the relative order of p and any candidate from D. This implies
that, after applying s, p must win pairwise elections against all n candidates in U. Let S ′ denote
the collection of all subsets S such that at least one unit shift is applied to vS (i.e. svS > 0). Consider
any element u ∈ U. Since p loses the pairwise election against u in the original election but wins
after the shifts, it must be that the shifts switch the order of p and u in at least one voter. This is
equivalent to: u ∈ S for some S ∈ S ′. In other words, we have ⋃S∈S ′ S = U, which implies that
OPT( I˜) 6 |S ′| = OPT(I) as desired. 
Next we use Lemma 20 with appropriate values of B and B′ to translate the hardness from (1,∞)-
all-or-nothing prices to unit prices. The properties of the reduction from Set Cover to Copelandα-
SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices are summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 27 There is a polynomial time reduction that takes as input an instance I˜ = (U,S) of Set Cover
and produces an instance I ′ of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices and B ∈ N such that
(i) any minimum cost shift action affects at most OPT( I˜) voters, and,
(ii) B ·OPT( I˜) 6 OPT(I ′) 6 2B ·OPT( I˜).
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We remark that Lemma 27 immediately implies the hardness for unit prices stated in Theorem 17.
This is because (i) implies that the reduction is FPT (i.e. the parameter in the new problem is no
more than the previous parameter), and (ii) implies that, for any constant τ, a τ-approximation for
OPT(I ′) would give a (2τ)-approximation for OPT( I˜); the latter is W[1]-hard (Theorem 25).
Proof of Lemma 27. Let an instance I˜ = (U,S) of Set Cover be our input. We first apply Lemma 26
to produce an instance I = (E,ψ, p) of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1,∞)-all-or-nothing
prices with election E = (C,V, {≻v}v∈V). We then invoke Lemma 20 with B = b · M + 1 and
B′ = B ·M to produce an instance I ′ with unit price functions.
The reduction clearly runs in polynomial time. Moreover, notice that E has width b and b 6 N <
|C|. Since B > b · M > b ·OPT(I), Lemma 20 implies that any optimal successful shift affects at
most OPT(I) = OPT( I˜) voters as desired.
Lemma 20 also yields OPT(I ′) > min{B′, B · OPT(I)} = B · OPT( I˜) and OPT(I ′) 6 (B + b) ·
OPT(I) 6 (2B) ·OPT( I˜), which completes our proof. 
6 Conclusions
We have given the first PTAS for SHIFT-BRIBERY for the case of positional scoring rules, and we
have shown severe limitations regarding approximability of Copelandα-SHIFT-BRIBERY. We have
also shown more efficient versions of our algorithms for the case of the Borda rule with unit
prices. Our PTAS improves upon the 2-approximation algorithm of Elkind et al. [EFS09, EF10],
but their algorithm is quite robust and was used, e.g., for combinatorial shift bribery [BFNT16]
and bribery in approval elections [FST17]. It may be possible to apply our technique in these
settings as well.
Another interesting direction is to see whether our ideas can be applied to the BRIBERY problem,
where the goal is to minimize the number of bribed voters but we are allowed to change each
bribed voter’s preference arbitrarily. On this front, Keller et al. [KHH18] give a PTAS for the prob-
lem for Borda, t-approval, and, more generally, any scoring rule that satisfies a certain technical
condition. It remains open whether a PTAS exists for all scoring rules.
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A NP-hardness of Uniform-All-or-Nothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY
Elkind, Faliszewski and Slinko [EFS09] showed NP-hardness of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY using
(1,∞)-all-or-nothing prices, whereas Bredereck et al. [BCF+16] adapted their proof to the case of
unit prices. In this section we show that NP-hardness holds already for uniform-all-or-nothing
prices.
Our reduction is similar in spirit to the one used by Elkind et al. [EFS09], but to avoid using ∞-
prices, we have to provide some more structure. To this end, we reduce from the CUBIC VERTEX
COVER problem, that is, from the VERTEX COVER problem on 3-regular graphs; it is well known
that CUBIC VERTEX COVER remains NP-hard [GJS76, FHJ98]. Formally, in CUBIC VERTEX COVER
we are given a graph G = (VG, EG), where each vertex has degree exactly three, and a positive
integer k. We ask if there is a subset A ⊆ VG of at most k vertices such that each edge is incident to
at least one vertex from A.
The idea of the reduction is to introduce nG = |VG| pairs of voters that represent the vertices of
G, and mG = |EG| candidates that represent the edges of G. We interpret bribing a voter (and
shifting the preferred candidate to the top position in his or her preference order) as including a
given vertex in the cover. Consequently, shifting a given candidate from EG back (by one position)
is interpreted as covering the corresponding edge. The constructed instance of uniform-all-or-
nothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY is a yes-instance if and only if all the candidates EG can be shifted
down by at least one position within the given budget. There are also additional voters that are
formed in such a way that bribing them is never beneficial (p is high in their rankings), but they
increase the scores of the candidates from EG so that they have more points than p. There are
also additional dummy candidates that are responsible for fixing the relative scores of our main
candidates.
Theorem 28 Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with uniform-all-or-nothing prices in NP-hard.
Proof. Recall that 〈B〉 denotes an arbitrary (but fixed) preference order over subset of candidates
B and
←−〈B〉 denotes the reverse of the order 〈B〉.
Let (G, k) be an instance of CUBIC VERTEX COVER, let nG = |VG|, and let mG = |EG|. Note
that mG =
3
2nG (because the graph is 3-regular) and k < nG (otherwise we have a trivial yes-
instance; we also assume that k > 3). We construct an instance (E, p, k) of the decision version
of the uniform-all-or-nothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY as follows. We let the candidate set be C =
{p} ∪ EG ∪ D, where D is a set of 3nG − 1 dummy candidates. We write t to denote the highest-
ranked dummy candidate in the order 〈D〉. Below we describe our collection of voters:
1. For each u ∈ VG, we introduce two voters, vu and v′u, with the following preference orders
(a, b, c ∈ EG are the edges incident to u):
vu : 〈D〉 ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ p ≻ 〈EG \ {a, b, c}〉
v′u :
←−〈D〉 ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ p ≻ ←−−−−−−−−−〈EG \ {a, b, c}〉.
2. Let L = nG+ 2k− 5. For each i ∈ [L], we introduce two voters, vEi and vE
′
i , with the following
preference orders:
vEi : 〈EG〉 ≻ p ≻ 〈D〉 ,
vE
′
i :
←−−〈EG〉 ≻ p ≻
←−〈D〉.
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3. Two voters, v−2 and v−1, with the following preference orders:
v−2 : 〈EG〉 ≻ t ≻ p ≻ 〈D \ {t}〉 ,
v−1 :
←−−〈EG〉 ≻ p ≻
←−〈D〉.
We note that |C| = 92nG and |V| = 2nG + nG + 2k− 5+ 2 6 5nG − 3. We see that the reduction can
be computed in polynomial time.
Let us now calculate the scores of candidate p, some arbitrary candidate e ∈ EG, some arbitrary
candidate d ∈ D \ {t}, and candidate t (recall that t ∈ D is ranked first in the order 〈D〉):
scE(p) = (2nG) · (mG − 3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mG − 3 points from each
pair of voters vu, v
′
u
+ 2L · |D|︸ ︷︷ ︸
|D| points from each
pair of voters vEi , v
E′
i
+ (3nG − 2) + (3nG − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points from voters v−2 and v−1
= 9n2G − 32nG + 12nGk− 4k+ 7,
scE(e) = 2 · (2mG − 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points from two pairs of
voters, vu1 , v
′
u1
and vu2 , v
′
u2
.
such that e = {u1, u2}
+ (nG − 2) · (mG − 4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points from remaining
pairs of voters vu, v
′
u
+ (L+ 1) · (2|D|+mG + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points from each pair of voters
vEi , v
E′
i , and from the pair v−2, v−1
= 9n2G − 32nG + 15nGk− 2k+ 8,
scE(d) = nG · (|D|+ 2mG + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points from each
pair of voters, vu, v
′
u
+ (L+ 1) · (|D| − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points from each pair of voters
vEi , v
E′
i , and from the pair v−2, v−1
= 9n2G − 14nG + 6nGk− 4k+ 8,
scE(t) = scE(d) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to v−2
.
One can readily verify that each edge candidate e ∈ EG has higher score than each candidate
from D. It is also clear that, prior to bribing voters, p is not a winner of our election. We claim that
p can become a winner by bribing at most k voters if and only if there is a cover for G of size a
most k.
(⇒) First, we show that if (G, k) is a yes-instance then (E, p, k) also is a yes-instance. Let A ⊆ VG
be a size-k set of vertices such that every edge is incident to at least one member of A; let VA be
the set of corresponding voters, i.e., VA = {vu | u ∈ A}. Let E′ be an election obtained by shifting
p to the top position in all the votes in VA (i.e., we bribe the voters in the set VA). Then we have:
1. scE′(p) = scE(p)+ k(|D|+ 3) = 9n2G− 32nG+ 15nGk− 2k+ 7, because p gains |D|+ 3 points
for each bribed voter.
2. For each e ∈ EG, we have scE′(e) 6 scE(e)− 1 = scE′(p), because, as A is a vertex cover, each
edge candidate loses at least one point.
3. For all d ∈ D \ {t}, scE′(d) = scE(d) − k 6 scE′(p), because d loses 1 point for each bribed
voter.
4. Lastly, scE′(t) = scE′(d) + 1 6 scE′(p).
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The inequalities in the last two items hold because we assumed that nG > k > 3. It shows that p
has at least as many points as the other candidates hence p is a winner.
(⇐) Next, we show that if (E, p, k) is a yes-instance of uniform-all-or-nothing Borda-SHIFT-
BRIBERY, then (G, k) is a yes-instance of CUBIC VERTEX COVER. Let VA be a set of k voters such
that if we push p to be ranked first by each of them, then p becomes a winner of the election. After
bribing k voters, the score of p increases at most by k(|D| + 3) (this happens if we bribe voters
of the form vu, v
′
u, for u ∈ VG; all the other voters rank p higher and, thus, bribing them gives
lower score increase for p). Thus, after bribing k voters the score of p is at most (by e we mean an
arbitrary edge candidate; all these candidates have identical scores):
9n2G − 32n+ 7+ 15nk− 2k = scE(e)− 1.
If VA contained at least one voter from the second or the third group, the score of p would be too
low. Hence, VA contains voters from the first group only, and for each e ∈ EG, VA must contain a
voter that ranks p below e. However, this means that the voters in VA must correspond to a vertex
cover for G of size at most k (VA may contain a pair of voters vu, v
′
u). 
The above proof gives some flexibility in fixing the scores of p and the edge candidates. Using
this flexibility, one might be able to obtain NP-hardness results for scoring rules similar to Borda
(e.g., scoring rules that give some additional advantage for being ranked first, such as those used
in Formula 1 racing).
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